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REGULATING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
 
Ash Amin 
University of Durham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective expressions of the positivity of belonging 
elude the state.  This is why the State, like any 
regulatory apparatus, follows, that which it 
regulates.  Its applications are always retrospective, 
sniffing out and running after feral belongings it 
must attempt to recoup, to rechannel into State-
friendly patterns (Massumi, 2002: 83, emphasis in 
original).   
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is well established that the gap between the global rich and the global poor has been 
growing.  For example, while the income gap between the fifth of the world’s population 
living in the richest countries and the fifth living in the poorest countries was 30 to 1 in 
1960, by 1997 it had grown to 74 to 1 (United Nations, 1999 – Human Development 
Report).  By the late 1990s, the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population possessed 86 
per cent of world GDP, while the poorest 20 per cent possessed a mere one per cent.  The 
income of the most prosperous tenth of the world’s households had more than eighty 
times the purchasing power of that of the poorest tenth (Therborn, 2001).  This gap is the 
product of the rich getting richer but also the poor getting poorer; a trend affecting the 
developed countries, but especially acute in the developing world, with large sections of 
the population in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, East and South Asia and the post-
communist states thrown back daily into abject poverty.  As John Lloyd (2001: 21) notes, 
‘half of the global population – roughly 3 billion people – live in abject poverty; nearly 
half of these – 1.2. billion in 2000 – live in utter destitution, on less than $1 dollar a day, 
in danger of death by starvation or a related disease.  Access to safe drinking water is 
unknown to 1 billion people; 2.4 billion have no adequate sanitation’.  The result is a 
shameful catalogue of woe marked by escalating early mortality, child labour, 
prostitution, disease and malnutrition, displacement and forced migration, the violences 
of social breakdown, state social control and factional war, acute risk and uncertainty, 
environmental degradation and vulnerability, and loss of existential and material security.   
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There is a live debate on whether this increase in global inequality and vulnerability can 
be linked to contemporary patterns of globalization, with opinion sharply divided along 
ideological and interpretative lines.  Neo-liberal opinion – among the Washington 
Consensus institutions and business lobbies, for example - remains convinced that the 
negative outcomes are the product of insufficient market freedom, that is, incomplete 
market-driven globalization.  It calls for total freedom of factor markets, free trade and 
market extension, supply side reforms to boost competitiveness and entrepreneurship, 
curbs on the redistributive state, and controls on inflation, interest rates and state 
expenditure.  Critics, in contrast, who range from social democrats for or against 
globalization to anti-globalization protestors, lay much of the blame on neo-liberal 
policies or unbridled global capitalism for the increase in inequality and vulnerability.  
The first group, led by governments in the global south (and belatedly the World Bank 
and certain G7 countries), while more or less neutral about the benefits of free trade and 
international investment, argues that excessive and rapid financial liberalization coupled 
to punitive structural adjustment policies enforced on governments, have fuelled 
unemployment, investment blight, poverty and indebtedness in the developing world 
(Stiglitz, 2002).  The second group, by no means unified, claims that the rising inequality 
is the product of the bias of international agreements towards the interests of Western 
countries and corporations, the exploitative practices of transnational organizations, the 
bias of free markets towards the fittest and most powerful, the loss of autonomy resulting 
from international integration, and the erosion of the economy of subsistence, well-being 
and needs by the market economy (Bray and Bray, 2002; Bello, 2002).   
 
These contrasting claims come with partial and anecdotal evidence, but a noticeable 
development in the last four to five years has been the growth of studies seeking to 
empirically measure the link between inequality and globalization on a more 
comprehensive basis.  Their results are much more circumspect.  For example, in a recent 
attempt to measure the relative weight of historical change, national processes and 
contemporary internationalization trends, Göran Therborn concludes that ‘global history 
and current national processes are the most potent producer of the current global 
outcomes of inequality’ (2001: 472, original emphasis)1.  Therborn also shows that the 
outcomes of contemporary internationalization have been highly differentiated:  while 
there appears to be no significant correlation between the size of international trade and 
domestic inequality, the liberalization of short term capital movements has had a major 
negative impact on the South, but in turn, the global flow of medical knowledge has 
‘played an outstanding, if not a solo performance, in bringing about the most important 
process of equalization of the world’ (p. 466).   
 
Similarly, Arthur Alderson and François Nielsen (2002) have undertaken a detailed 
analysis of the impact of globalization – measured in terms of outward FDI, imports from 
the South and in-migration – on income inequality in a number of OECD countries since 
the 1970s.  Their empirical findings show that all three dimensions of globalization 
                                                 
1 This is not to necessarily diminish the role of globalization, since it could be argued that national 
processes are increasingly defined by the latter (e.g. the orders of international organizations), but 
conclusions of this kind do provide a salutary check on excessive demonizations of globalization, however 
defined. 
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appear to have played a part, by inter alia, accelerating deindustrialization, weakening 
the bargaining power of labour, reducing the returns to unskilled labour, increasing skills 
heterogeneity within the labour force, and intensifying competition within the labour 
market.  Interestingly, however, they also show that the rise in inequality can be 
associated with other factors tenuously linked to globalization.  These include labour 
force shift out of agriculture at a time of constrained growth in industry, demographic 
expansion, de-unionization, the decline of wage-setting coordination, and the growth of 
female labour force participation.  Indeed, in ranking the factors, the authors conclude 
that outward FDI and imports from the South have been less significant in increasing 
inequality than agricultural shift, labour market deregulation and the strength of social 
democratic welfare protections within each country.   
 
These two examples alone show that establishing a link between globalization and 
inequality is fraught with difficulty, not only because of how globalization is defined and 
how inequality is measured, but also because the entanglements between globalization 
forces and ‘domestic’ trends are not that easy to separate out (e.g. do the local economic 
effects of home based TNCs or the effects of the Washington Consensus within the US 
count as outcomes of globalization or internal changes?).  However, there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that contemporary processes of globalization have been 
accompanied by a rise in global inequality and vulnerability. 
 
The urgency, therefore, to regulate globalization in ways that will reduce poverty and 
inequality cannot be underestimated.  But the key question is whether this can be done 
through existing institutional and spatial arrangements.  According to one reading of 
contemporary economic globalization, the processes of time-space compression, global 
connectivity and world-scape formation involved are defining a new, topologically and 
heterarchically structured economic space that is quite different from the hitherto 
dominant world system based on territorially organized and state-regulated economies 
(Urry 2003; Amin, 2002; Shepherd, 2002).  Contemporary developments such as trade 
and financial liberalization, global corporate and technological organization, and rapid 
flows of money, information, expertise and people are considered to amount to more than 
a simple turn in the longue durée of the world system, more than the machinations of the 
transnational capitalist class or Washington coalition, more than a (neo-liberal) blip that 
can be reversed with the help of the state-centered tools of yesteryear, and more than a 
problem of multi-level governance.  The reading, thus, comes with a strong sense of 
radical change and of no return in the conduct and regulation of the global economy, and 
a considerable degree of agnosticism about the nature and possibility of a new regulatory 
settlement. 
 
In contrast, as already hinted, there is another set of readings of economic globalization 
which seem much more certain of the ways of the new world order, possibly because 
their focus falls less on change in the everyday map of economic organization than on the 
rules that hold the system together.  Spurred by the neo-liberal onslaught, they come with 
an assuredness about how globalization should be managed.  Pursue the minimal state, 
deregulation, liberalization, privatization, free enterprise, market society and market 
morality and you will have freedom, prosperity and fulfillment, say the apologists 
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arguing for more market.  Pursue all of this and you have heightened global risk, 
inequality and misery, say its critics arguing for a new social democratic consensus or for 
a post-capitalist order.  Common across the differences is the assumption that the global 
economy can be harnessed, tamed, controlled – either from above or below – around a 
global regulatory meta-narrative.   
 
This paper brings together these two readings of economic globalization, in an attempt to 
interpret both as theses on ‘regulation’.  This is an uncommon move, because by and 
large the processes dealt with by the first reading have not been interpreted as realms of 
regulation in their own right.  As a consequence, the discussion on global regulation, 
animated by the second reading, has tended to proceed in terms of thinking of regulation 
as a separate institutional filed that acts upon another entity called the economy.  My aim 
is to show that if placed on the same analytical plane, the readings offer markedly 
different interpretations of regulatory processes and possibilities, with the former 
stressing the heterarchical and topological nature of ordering in the contemporary 
globalizing economy, and the latter tending to stress its hierarchical and scalar nature and 
so also possibilities of Olympian control.  Each comes with different normative 
implications, which is why it is worth comparing them.   
 
Some observers might be tempted to argue that the two are not comparable and claim that 
while the Olympian reading deals with affairs of macroeconomic management, the latter 
is concerned with processes of micro-regulation.  I disagree.  The micro/macro distinction 
becomes artificial, once the economy is seen as an assemblage of circuits of provision 
that fold actants with regulatory power at different levels into one field of action (from 
national employment law and monetary policies and international environmental 
regulations and trade agreements, to labour market rules, technology arrangements, and 
various firm-centered governance conventions).  If we accept that micro regulation and 
macro regulation are co-constituted, perhaps even points along the same continuum, then 
the juxtaposition of the Olympian and heterarchical readings has much to reveal about the 
nature and potential of order in the globalized economy.  For example, a common refrain 
of the Olympian reading, as we shall in the first half of the paper, is that global neo-
liberalism is generating a regulatory deficit, which, if filled with pro-developmental and 
pro-poor policies, can provide a stable macroeconomic framework for closing the growth 
versus equity gap within and between the nations.  In contrast, it could be deduced from 
the heterarchical reading, as we shall see in the second half, that contemporary economic 
globalization is resulting in an excess of regulation, in a multiplicity of orderings of a 
trans-scalar and relational nature that contradict Olympian readings which continue to 
make strong territorial or scalar assumptions about the nature of economic organization 
and economic returns.  The normative implications of these different opinions on 
regulatory possibilities will be taken up in the conclusion. 
 
Meta-Narratives of Global Order 
 
The growing concern over the spatial and social inequalities associated with market 
fundamentalism, the Washington Consensus and the unchecked activities of the 
transnational business elite, has stimulated wide ranging debate on the nature of world 
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reforms necessary to tackle these inequalities.  A range of new meta-narratives of 
regulation, of possible order are emerging as alternatives to neo-liberal regulation.   
 
Globalization with a Human Face  
 
One discernible meta-narrative of global regulation is what Takis Fotpoulos (2001) has 
called globalization with a human face.  It accepts the logic of market capitalism, 
especially free trade, but not the excesses of neo-liberal regulation or abuses of state 
regulation.  It is, in many ways, the global equivalent of Third Way experiments in social 
liberalism and a new ethic of social responsibility pioneered by Clinton and Blair.  A key 
argument is that the globalized economy requires effective global regulation, which 
hitherto has been piecemeal and captured by specialist interests as well as unchecked by a 
predominantly national or inter-governmental system of regulation.   
 
A range of reforms are proposed, or implementation at global level and within the South, 
to tackle poverty and inequality.  For example, Amartya Sen (    ) and others critical of 
the crushing weight of state planning, bureaucratic deficiency and corporatism in the 
developing world or the once socialist states have argued for a dual approach centered 
around, on the one hand, building capabilities and grass-roots democracy to unlock local 
potential and competitiveness, and, on the other hand, empowerment of global NGOs and 
NGO networks in order to provide a counterweight to G7 and corporate-dominated 
international regulation.  David Held (2002) has gone further to argue for a new 
cosmopolitan order that legislates for ‘people’s equal moral worth, their active agency 
and what is required for their autonomy and development’ (p. 67), through a legally 
binding and enforceable international code of conduct.  Such a code should reframe ‘the 
ground rules or basic laws of the free-market and trade system’ (p. 72) by tying them 
closely to cosmopolitan principles to ensure the ‘firm enactment of existing human rights 
and environmental agreements and the clear articulation of these with the ethical codes of 
particular industries’ (p. 72).  Similarly, Richard Falk (2003) has argued that such 
reforms, harnessed to other universal principles of democracy such as consent of the 
citizenry, rule of law, human rights, participation and accountability will ensure that 
globalization can work as a force for good. 
 
This appeal to a cosmopolitan democracy extended to corporate practices can be tied to a 
growing momentum of interest in a ‘responsible global capitalism’ (Dunning, 2003) or 
new market morality based on social inclusion.  Tackling global inequality is seen to be 
less a matter of interfering with unfolding processes of globalization, than that of 
changing the terms on which wealth is generated and appropriated in the market 
economy.  John Dunning (2003), for example, argues that an opening has arisen from the 
rise of an alliance-based capitalism that relies centrally on creativity and cooperation for 
competitive advantage, one which ‘demands a reordering and reprioritization of moral 
values, and an attitude of mind’ (p. 24) towards a universal ethos of compassion2.    A 
                                                 
2 He includes in this ethos enlightened self interest, a global ethic based on humanity, reciprocity, respect 
for life, non-violence, truthfulness, justice and partnership, and the codes of moral conduct enshrined in 
different religious and belief systems. 
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new market morality is seen to be a vital element in securing socially responsible 
economic behaviour. 
 
Other regulatory elements of ‘global capitalism with a human face’ are less reliant on 
moral arguments.  For example, the disastrous record of Washington-driven policies of 
structural adjustment over the last two decades has fuelled a reform movement – 
increasingly supported by the World Bank and social democratic governments – calling 
for the explicit reorientation of global institutions and inter-governmental agreements 
oriented towards pro-poor and pro-developmental policies.  Joe Stiglitz (2003: 88), for 
example, argues for a new post-Washington Consensus paradigm that: 
 
… takes as its core objective development, the transformation of society.  
It recognizes that an integral part of successful development is the increase 
in GDP per capita.  But this is only part of the story, and even this will not 
be achieved unless the country adopts a broader and more socially 
oriented development focus.  If successful, the new development strategy 
will not only raise GDP per capita, but also living standards, as evidenced 
by standards of health and literacy and a reduction of such bads as crime 
and drugs.  It will reduce poverty – our goal should be its elimination …..  
It will be sustainable, strengthening the environment.  And the real 
societal transformations will enhance the likelihood that the underlying 
policies will be durable, withstanding the vicissitudes sometimes 
accompanying democratic processes.   
 
There is no shortage of proposals for the international policy community, gathered 
around a kind of reworked global Keynesianism.  One proposal is for the WTO to have 
greater representation from the South and for its conversion into a development 
institution, so that inter alia, free trade can work for the South by eliminating restrictive 
practices and protectionism in the North and by relaxing intellectual property rights rules 
that prevent science an technology development in the South (Stiglitz, 2003; Deardorff 
and Stern, 2002; Helleiner, 2001).  Another proposal is to reorient the international 
financial regime – private and public - towards developmental goals, by restricting short 
term capital flight, facilitating the access of low income countries to medium term capital 
via better access to bond markets or conversion of the IMF into a development fund, 
reducing the debt burden of countries, and ensuring that aid supports human well-being 
(Stiglitz, 2002; White, 2001).  A third proposal is to ensure that developing countries 
receive better tax income from international investors, to name and shame exploitative 
and unethical investors (White, 2001, supported by stricter enforcement of international 
labour, environmental and fair trade standards.   
 
The new social democratic narrative, in its various strands, assumes that a new global 
regulatory regime will be able to tackle the abuses of an unregulated capitalism without 
the need to alter its fundamentals.  As Gordon Brown (2003), UK Chancellor of the 
Exchequer argues, globalization can be made good through effective regulation at the 
world scale and binding commitment to people-oriented growth.  While the proposals 
come with a long overdue clarity as a coherent alternative to neo-liberalism, their 
 6
prospect on the ground seems less secure.  They promise both too much and too little.  
First, the recommendations come with a surprising lack of attentiveness to issues of 
agency and power play.  Contemporary international regulation is geared towards state 
and corporate interests (see next sub-section) that actually benefit from the world as it is 
and its Washington Consensus institutions are far from likely to cave in.  In turn, it is far 
from clear who is to lead the charge in making sure that cosmopolitan democracy, an 
ethic of responsibility, and a developmental and pro-poor regulatory regime is put into 
place at world level.  Indeed many states in the North and elites in the South will 
vehemently oppose the reforms for the threat they pose to vested interests.   
 
Second, in order to be effective, the new international regime will have to work as an 
integrated regulatory system, but it is far from the literature how, and by whom, the 
actions of the various institutions – the WTO, IMF, World Bank and other financial 
institutions NGOs, aid organizations, influential fora such as the World Economic Forum, 
guardians of cosmopolitan democracy – are to be mutually reinforced and policed.  In 
fact, as I shall argue in the second half of this paper, there is far too much variety and 
regulatory agency in emerging world economic networks for such coordinated 
governance to work effectively.  
 
Third, some key actants on inequality and poverty are left out of the regulatory frame in 
this particular meta-narrative.  One of the arguments of the anti-globalization movement 
is that deregulation and market liberalism in general have contributed to risk and 
vulnerability in the South by increasing cash and market dependency, destabilizing the 
subsistence economy, and destroying traditional and small-scale activities, thus 
undermining making any solution that fails to regulate market dynamics (Kirby, 2002; 
Seabrook, 2002).  Another argument is that TNCs and other powerful players such as 
international banks are deeply embedded in the production of inequality, through their 
influence over governments, their tax evasion schemes, their poor environmental record, 
their labour market practices, their locational mobility, their market power, their dumping 
practices.  It is naïve to assume that moves towards corporate social responsibility in a 
frame of putative cooperation within a putative alliance capitalism, will reverse these 
bads.  Few in the South will be taken in by the argument that the ‘multiple checks and 
balances imposed by a globally integrated economy, in which multinational corporations 
and non-government organizations play and important policing role, combined with the 
spread of global communications, means that all societies will be more open, less cut off 
and less prey to authoritarian leaders with messianic visions of the future and the past 
(Leadbeater, 2002: 331). 
 
Human Face without Globalization 
 
A second distinctive meta-narrative of regulation that is emerging is one arguing for a 
reversal of globalization and the re-centering of the global economy around national or 
inter-state systems of control.  It sees globalization as a politically driven project, driven 
by the Washington Consensus institutions (the US government, the IMF, World Bank, 
WTO, G7, major corporations and various free market lobbyists and apologists) and 
legitimated by states that stand to gain as well as those told to think there is no alternative 
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to neo-liberalism.  Pierre Bourdieu (2002: 31), for example, argues that so powerful has 
been the grip of the discourse of globalization based on combining the ‘lexicon of liberty, 
liberalism, and deregulation’ that these states have actually consented to ‘divest 
themselves of the power to control economic forces’ and to actively encourage 
globalization (Conley, 2002).  States, it is said, have done this partly in the hope of some 
economic returns, but also due to the influence of the transnational capitalist elite 
(composed of TNC executives and their local affiliates, the globalizing bureaucrats and 
politicians based in major international organizations, the mobile professions based in 
foundations, think tanks, the mass media, and business-led networks such as the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists or the WEF at Davos) that has taken the ‘necessary 
steps to institutionalize its transnational role’ (Fotopoulos, 2001: 255) and succeeded in 
convincing that its agenda is the only option for world capitalism.   
 
According to this meta-narrative, which holds in a human face without globalization, a 
new regulatory settlement is possible if the conceit of transnational liberalism can be 
exposed and resisted to demonstrate that much of economic life can be regulated through 
fairly orthodox means around national settlements, democratically contested inter-
governmental agreements, and renewed civic participation.  Bourdieu, for example, 
argues that the ‘repoliticization of policy’ (2001) should include vigorous defense of the 
social state, coordinated action by governments and larger political units such as the EU 
to tax and tame capital, better coordination between disparate social movements, and a 
renewed trade unionism at European scale, so that an effective momentum for another 
model of economic organization and reward is built.  Others such as Leo Panitch (2000) 
argue that pressure from below – across the full range of social forces – should force 
liberal governments to press for global change in the priorities of inter-state meetings and 
international organization such as the WTO and IMF.  Similarly, Leslie Sklair (2000) 
suggests that the attempts of the transnational capitalist class to build global presence 
through high profile meetings such as Davos or influence over the media and business 
curricula, should be exposed as purely interest-ridden.   
 
In this new model of international regulation – to be actively pushed by national and 
international social movements – the role of the state is considered pivotal.  For example, 
Hirst and Thompson (2002), envisage the possibility of global re-regulation through the 
channels of intergovernmental cooperation, through pressure brought on the US to work 
in a multilateral framework, and through reforms to the workings of existing international 
institutions (along the lines spelt out above).  For them, it is far too premature to speak of 
the need for regulation at the global level, owing to the ‘continued relevance of classic 
international relations’ (Hirst and Thompson, 2002: 254) negotiated through an inter-state 
system of diplomacy and threat, as states continuing to ‘seek to protect their populations 
an to monopolize and control the distribution of key resources’ (ibid: 254).  The US, of 
course, is a prime example of this, acting according to Michael Mann (2001/2) as a 
template state behaviour in international affairs.  Those who concede that the historic 
power of the state is being restricted by the rise of governance beyond the state, still 
maintain, as does Armand Mattelart (2002: 609), that ‘like it or not, the territory of the 
nation-state remains the place where the social contract is defined.  It has by no means 
reached the degree of obsolescence suggested by the crusade in favour of 
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deterritorialization through networks’.  State based re-regulation plus democratically 
negotiated inter-governmentalism, it is believed, can tackle the global inequalities 
exacerbated by neo-liberalism.   
 
This thesis rests centrally on the argument that the world economy remains highly 
territorialized, based around demarcated trading blocs, national and sub-national sources 
of competitiveness and innovation, increasing returns on a national basis, and national 
patterns of economic exclusion and inequality.  Indeed, the thesis generally is skeptical of 
the idea of a world economy composed of transnational flow, ubiquity and instantaneity, 
distanciated effects and global organization and regulation.  Much of the debate on 
economic globalization over the last decade has been dominated by the confrontation of 
these two positions, with neither camp giving much ground.  I do not intend to repeat the 
debate here, but simply to summarize the account of globalization on which this thesis 
bases its position on regulation.  Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999; 2002) have 
been at the vanguard of denying economic globalization, arguing that the world economy 
continues to best described as an inter-state entity.  They have argued that foreign direct 
investment continues to be dominated by flows to and from a restricted number of 
countries, that its decennial increase has started to peak, that transnational corporations 
continue to work from the home base and sell in circumscribed trading blocs, that world 
trade too is divided into three major trading blocs dominated by nation-states, that 
economic transactions fall away dramatically with distance, and that while international 
trade may be expanding, so to is domestic trade.  Indeed, most recently (2002), they have 
gone so far as to argue that like past cycles of globalization, the present one may have 
reached its limits, notably in terms of the slow down in the growth of international trade.  
The upshot is that ‘nation-states are not being overwhelmed and that the future of 
extended multilateral governance does not look promising – in a turbulent physical and 
international environment the nation-state may become more salient as a means of 
protection against global forces beyond supranational governance …’ (p. 263).   
 
This controversial thesis has been roundly criticized for defining economic globalization 
rather to narrowly, for ignoring the qualitative aspects of economic transnationalism as 
well as the grip of TNCs on international trade and market power, for disregarding the 
array of visible and invisible forces (e.g. brands, consumption habits, media and 
commercial processes, technological and financial developments, rhetoric) that make up 
and sustain global networks, for not tracing the distant or virtual events in a highly 
connected world that routinely affect processes and outcomes in the least expected places 
(e.g. the role of speculation in world financial markets in the East Asian crisis), and for 
failing to grasp how new globalised networks are disrupting economies organized as 
container spaces.  This failure to grasp the changing spatial ontology of economic 
organization, which is resulting in an intensifying clash between territorial systems (the 
world as a string of national economies) and network/flow arrangements (the world as a 
continuum of networks of varying length and duration) is perhaps the key weakness of 
this nation-centered interpretation of globalization.  It plays down the significance of 
regulatory arrangements that come with the new global flows and networks (as shown in 
the next section) and because of this it underestimates how real has been the relativization 
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of power and influence across the globe, both spatially and institutionally (Jessop, 1999; 
Peck and Tickell, 2002).   
 
The case for reversing globalization remains unconvincing because of all that is left out 
in the making of the contemporary world.  The nation-centered Left is right to remind us 
of the enduring role of the state/inter-governmentalism, but it is wrong in assuming that 
this remains the only or most significant channel of regulation and political change.  The 
rise of the anti-globalization movement, the rise and effectiveness of the transnational 
elite, and the power that international organizations are acquiring in their own right is 
testimony to this radical relativisation of state-centered regulation.  So too is the rise of 
new forms of global organization that are set to multiply and sidestep, complicate and 
challenge embedded statism and its underlying assumptions of meta-order. 
 
Heterarchies of Order 
 
There is growing recognition that one of the distinctive achievements of contemporary 
globalization is the routinization of a new spatial ontology based on network forms and 
flows of varied geographical composition, reach and duration (Dicken et al, 2001; Amin, 
2002; Massey, 2004; Larner and Le Heron, 2002; Urry, 2003; Sheppard,  ).  It is a 
radically transformative ontology covering all areas of social life.  It includes the spatial 
radiations of telecommunications and transport networks around the world, which in 
many places, can isolate proximate neighbours (Graham, 2002).  It includes cultural 
domains that cut across lines of longitude and latitude in complex spatial arrangements 
(Nederveen Pieterse, 2003).  It consists of a mass of supply chains and corporate 
networks that tie producers, intermediaries and consumers in the most unexpected places 
in highly structured and close patterns of mutuality and dependence (Dicken, 2003; 
Hughes and Reimer, 2004).  It includes well-trodden but not always visible tracks of 
transnational migration, tourism, business travel, asylum, and organized terror, which 
dissect through, and lock, established communities into new circuits of belonging and 
attachment, resentment and fear (Castles and Miller, 1998; Gray, 2003).  It includes 
transhuman networks of sacred, viroid, digital, animal and plant life that summon 
meaning and attachment at microcosmic, bodily, aerial, epidemiological, planetary and 
cosmological scales, and which thoroughly infuse life at any given site (Whatmore, 
2002).  It includes spaces of emotional attachment whose geographies are almost as 
varied as life on earth, ranging from the workings of home, family and the playground, to 
the long cultural networks that feed the screen and the musical arrangements etched on 
CDs.  It involves political registers that now far exceed the traditional sites of 
community, town hall, parliament, state and nation, spilling over into the machinery of 
virtual public spheres, international organizations, global social movements, diaspora 
politics, and planetary or cosmopolitan projects (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Connolly, 2002).   
 
The sum of these developments is a new spatial ontology that thoroughly disrupts the 
dominant spatial ontology of territorial units of organization and scalar regulation that we 
have become used to.  As I have implied above, it does not amount to a mapping of 
global level processes, flows and domains upon older arrangements at other spatial 
scales.  Instead, it should be read as a force field affecting and rearranging all spatial 
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relations and orderings; radically altering the meaning of core boundary distinctions 
categories such as inside and outside, home and world, near and afar, intimate and 
strange.  For example, new communities of belonging are now formed in cyberspace and 
across vast physical distances with the help of various immutable mobiles, thereby 
altering the distinction between relational and territorial meanings of space/place or 
home/world.  In turn, the geographically local is now distanced from the physically 
proximate as sites are pulled into dispersed networks of firms, kinship or imagined 
communities.  Conversely, on-going territorial relations – in local economic clusters, 
regional identities or national imaginaries – are now so shot through with trans-territorial 
presences and absences – from the flows of people and information and goods and 
images to the effects of interest rate and political decisions elsewhere - that they cannot 
be grasped as social formations without recognition of their multiple constitutive 
geographies.   
 
There is no descriptor that properly captures this new spatial ontology.  John Urry 
suggests the term ‘fractal space’, to highlight the spatial blurring resulting from the 
symbiosis of bodies, computers, groups, communications networks, societies and 
cybernetic systems.   He explains, ‘global relations thus involve new fractal social spaces, 
as each realm folds over, under, through and beyond each other in striking new social 
topologies.  These are ‘firelike’, oscillatory, flickering, both here and there, both inside 
and outside rather like a Mobius strip’ (Urry, 2003: 74).  Globalization seen as a force 
field along these lines has considerable implications in terms of how we conceptualize 
the spaces and conduct of the economy and what we decide counts as economic life.   
 
First, these fractal spaces are at once spaces of network relations (Dicken et. al., 2001) 
and fields exercising a ‘powerful gravity effect upon numerous, diverse localized 
patterns’ (Urry, 2003: 94).  They have an architecture of their own, in the way that global 
supply chains or networks of transnational corporations or virtual circuits of global 
financial traders might have, but they also act as a force pulling in situated arrangements 
into a wider constitutive field, in the way that, say, environmental disasters in one part of 
the world might destroy the print industry in another part of the world by raising the price 
of wood, or how trends towards unitary global business and accounting norms might 
drive decision-making and economic appraisal in different locations.  Events in this dual 
spatial structure – network space and gravitational space – continually jostle to generate 
unpredictable emergent forms.  It is emergence of this nature – the production of novelty 
through relational interaction between the elements of a system – that requires a reading 
of globalization as the continual making of a new world order with novel spatial 
arrangements and rules (which is why interpretations of globalization as the spread or 
synthesis of known spatial ontologies are so hopelessly wrong).  The spatial structure of 
these emergent forms is, by definition, hard to predict.  It may include, as Urry argues, a 
new everyday planetary consciousness fed by the many world signifiers that are 
constantly paraded these days, including satellite images of a small world, global brand 
names and companies, world music, CNN, American Express.  It may include new site 
practices as centre points for global interaction, such as sitting all day in front of a 
terminal, where the combination of operator dexterity and expertise, chat with colleagues, 
sophisticated software, and ability to manipulate live information, allow meaningful and 
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effective business with the rest of the world (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002; Beunza 
and Stark, 2002).  It may include mobility patterns – physical and virtual - across time 
and space zones, that gradually lay down tramlines that come to work as standards 
against which business success is measured.  It may include new spatial topologies that 
are still only liminal in form or yet to be made.  What is significant, however, is that these 
emergent forms have considerable force as the orderings of contemporary globalization.   
 
Secondly, as a consequence, it is essential to grasp globalization as a performative act, as 
is increasingly recognized in sociological and geographical work.  In part, this 
performativity is about scripting new global economic protocols for all to follow and be 
measured by. The meta-narratives discussed earlier can be read in this way, as can the 
work of all manner of cultural technologies to engineer ecumenical status for virtues that 
are supposed to drive the new knowledge economy or alliance capitalism.  These include 
new business management credos advocating connectivity, theatricality, youthfulness, 
speed, branding, imaging, imagination and creativity (Thrift, 2002), the constant 
outpouring of new names, concepts and icons such as CyberCity, Infotainment, cool 
hunter, e-trader, dream weaver, chaos pilot and cool hunter to mark the future (Löfgren, 
2003), and the generation of a series of ‘catwalk’ technologies such as global benchmarks 
to calculate the international competitiveness of products and processes in different parts 
of the world (Larner and Le Heron, 2002), or orchestrations of events to show off 
presence and worth (Löfgren, 2003).  A whole army of actors3 are drafted into 
performing the new global economic ecumene, in judging who and what counts in the 
new knowledge economy.   
 
The performance of globalization is also about the constant renegotiation of what counts 
as the economic.  This is not to claim an elevated status, for example, for ‘cultural 
economy’ in the present global circumstances, since the economy across the ages has 
been the artifact of moral assumptions, aesthetic impulses, passion play, knowledge 
work, and cultures of discipline and regulation (Amin and Thrift, 2004).  I do not wish to 
argue that the economy has become more culturally inflected under conditions of 
globalization.  Instead, the argument is about treating contemporary globalization as a 
new kind of cultural economy performance with new mappings.  So, for example, Spike 
Peterson (2002) argues that an attentiveness to reproductive, productive, and virtual 
domains of the economy allows us to see contemporary economic globalization as a 
process that ‘brings the identities, ideologies, and practices of ‘social reproduction’, 
welfare provisioning, non-wage labor and informalization into relation with the familiar 
but currently restructured ‘productive economy’ of commodity exchange, as well as with 
the less familiar but increasingly consequential – though dematerialized – ‘virtual 
economy’ of financial markets, cyberspace, and the exchange less of goods than of signs’ 
(p. 5).  There are long chains – spatial and compositional – of material that enter into any 
given economic network which need recognition.  For example, the prolific discussion on 
the implications of transnational corporations in world development would benefit from 
attending to the effects of domestic gender relations, informal work and the remittance 
                                                 
3 These include magazines, newspapers, quality auditors, business consultants, IT and media specialists and 
specialist outlets, advertising agencies, event organizers, management gurus, performance indicators, 
measurement tools, and so on, 
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economy, the effects of employee investment of savings in world stock markets, or the 
effects of material and symbolic cultures of production and consumption.  It would both 
reveal the breadth of what we choose to define as ‘economic’ globalization and also 
puncture the generalizations of good or bad that abound in this field of study, by 
revealing the heterogeneous and often unexpected performances of the varied objects-in-
relation.  It would tell both the story of low wages, poor working conditions, 
displacement and (s)exploitation in TNC-dominated export processing zones in the 
Global south, and the story of self-help projects to supplement income, acquisition of 
new competences and confidences, pooling of wages to establish women’s centres and 
other local welfare-oriented projects, and a re-balancing of gender power in the home 
(Bergerson, 2001).   
 
Finally, thinking about globalization as a performance helps to reveal that the new 
formations need to be worked at, maintained, aligned, made to count.  They have no pre-
given structural power (Dicken et al, 2001), which is why a reading of globalization as 
the unfolding of an immanent capitalist logic or the inscribed power of old suspects is in 
itself suspect.  If a power dynamic emerges, separating out clear winners and losers and 
clear lines of command and obeisance, rather like a tramline, it is the inscription of 
recursive relations, it is the mobilization of all kinds of material - warnings, predations, 
territorial markings, minions, allies and rumours - to ensure that returns flow in one 
direction, and it is the naturalization of rules, markings and commentaries that come to be 
never questioned.  Entire network architectures – their flow lines, nodes, spaces, contours 
– and all their actants – key players, codes, rules, technologies, symbols, calculative 
practices, employees, buildings, terminals - are made to work to hold the shape of the 
field of action and to channel rewards and exercise influence in certain directions.  This is 
why, to return to the example of transnational corporations, the study of the role of these 
corporations in world development must examine the effects of business management 
canons, metrics of measurement and evaluation, software rules, supply-chain 
conventions, business travel patterns, knowledge generation cultures, and rituals of 
alignment and belonging.  These ‘small’ things are central in influencing who and what 
gets rules in and ruled out or rewarded, and yet they rarely feature in assessments of the 
relationship between globalization and poverty and inequality. 
 
Micro-worlds of Regulation 
 
All of the above three examples of global performativity can be read as tales of 
ordering/regulation.  All three are fields of action that rely on an assemblage of objects-
in-relation to define the field, set the rules of play, order the play, hold things together.  
We saw from the discussions on global ecumene and cultural economy, that culture, 
technology, passion, cognition, aesthetic evaluation and acting up are not only part of the 
fabric of economic conduct, but also centrally involved in setting the rules of conduct.  
Similarly, we saw from the illustration of corporate networks that the process of global 
network formation is itself of ordering and regulation hidden in the inscriptions of small 
things and embodied conventions.  In turn, all three examples are mappings of regulation 
that transect geographies of regulation based on territorial jurisdiction and scalar reach.  
They all point to another logic of regulation – heterarchical, topological, and micro-
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performative - that does not correspond with meta-orders of regulation, with their 
emphasis on territory, state and nested hierarchy.  These ‘micro-performances’ of 
regulation, importantly, are neither minor in significance nor small in reach.  On the 
contrary, they are globally significant in terms of both power (e.g. via new global 
ecumenical norms) and spatial reach (e.g. via s of order in networks of a transnational 
nature).  The three examples below illustrate the regulatory dynamics at work across new 
global economic landscapes, including their relationship with meta-orders discussed in 
the first half of the paper. 
 
First, to return to the role of transnational corporations in world development, debate 
over the last thirty years has focused on the nature of rules that states and international 
organizations should introduce to maximize local returns.  In the course of time, the 
discourse on regulation has changed to reflect the evolution of the firms from home-
based organizations with a hierarchy of operations around the world towards global 
organizations commanding long supply chains, networks and consumption norms across 
the world.  Thus, early calls for nation-centered policies on transfer pricing, local 
sourcing, and jobs and working conditions, gave way to calls for international agreements 
to prevent capital flight and investment switching between regions, coupled to a raft of 
global protocols on corporate social responsibility, dumping and market manipulation, 
and branding and advertising.  There is no doubt that related regulations served to 
influence corporate strategy and behaviour and shape local outcomes.  My aim is not to 
argue that the corporations have escaped regulation thus defined.  Instead, it is to claim 
that the economic and social worlds held together by the transnational corporations have 
become regimes of order in their own right.  For example, conduct in the vast supply 
chains that feed the corporations – from the duration of local contracts to the quality of 
local employment - are directly influenced by the pricing policies and credit 
arrangements of the corporations, by the purchasing practices of major subcontractors, by 
the mode of audit and risk assessment used and by the methods of a new breed of third 
party consultants that has grown in recent years to manage supply chains on behalf of 
major corporations (Hughes, 2004).  Exactly the same can be said of the complex 
arrangements that manage horizontal networks involving joint ventures, alliances, 
licensing agreements, knowledge transfer schemes, and the like, with outcomes linked to 
codings such as the formal status of the agreements, auditing procedures and the alliance-
management tools.   
 
These inflections – together with a series of corporation-specific habits, routines, 
management cultures, knowledge practices, employee relations and sociality patterns - 
matter crucially as the rules of conduct that drive particular networks, explaining why 
standard rules of the sort discussed in the first half of the paper yield highly differentiated 
outcomes in different locations.  In part, the variety is the product of the sheer ‘excess’ of 
regulation at work in different networks, and in part, it is the product of the interface 
between the scalar, largely state-led, regimes of governance and the relational, corporate-
led, regimes.  This is not to deny any correspondence between the regimes, as this would 
be to deny the long history of corporate influence over state policy, and vice versa4.  
                                                 
4 For example, Henry Yeung (2002) has argued that varying discourses of globalization (e.g. US-led attacks 
on protectionism) and globalism (e.g. constructions of scalar geographies to ‘convince social and economic 
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Instead, it is to argue that in tracing the effects of TNCs in world poverty and inequality, 
it is essential to examine corporate network management practices – and their complex 
constituent factors – since these shape employment outcomes and development potential 
in different sites within the networks.   
 
A second example of heterarchical regulation with crucial implications for 
territorial/scalar policy perspectives on the potential alliance capitalism relates to the rise 
of transnational knowledge networks.  An emerging theme in development thinking is 
that countries can survive globalization by investing in knowledge assets and the supply-
base in general to compete their way out of poverty.  This theme is central to proposals 
for an international framework that allows countries to develop capabilities and 
educational opportunities (Sen, 1992), local clusters of knowledge and learning (Scott 
and Storper, 2003), and national innovation systems that bridge science, technology and 
application in a fairer intellectual property rights regime (Stiglitz, 2002).  The anti-
globalization movement too, rests much of its case on the preservation of indigenous 
knowledges to meet local subsistence and human development needs, centred around 
localized systems of provision (Goldsmith and Mander,  2001).  All the perspectives 
share the assumption that knowledge systems are geographically territorial.   
 
This assumption is not supported by the now everyday incorporation of scientific, applied 
and tacit knowledge within powerful global networks.  Indeed, in the field of 
development policy itself, the last twenty years have seen an explosion of epistemic 
communities and issue networks involving development agencies, foundations, think 
tanks, universities, consultancies, training agencies, individual experts, and a host of 
scripted material and shared cultures.  These networks, now ‘a primary mechanism for 
the spread of knowledge’ (Stone, 2002: 1), defy notions of territorial knowledge 
formation, involving as they do, globally dispersed invisible colleges and chains of 
knowledge transmission, a continuously traveling expert community, extensive virtual 
communications, and knowledge as a mobile good.  This has become true for both 
official and oppositional policy on development priorities and options, with both sides 
drawing on transnational networks that only too often draw on the same actors (e.g. think 
tanks and independent academics and consultants).   
 
These knowledge networks act as regulatory mechanisms, in forming media opinion, 
attracting political patronage and donor support, spreading ideas, values and specific 
programmes, acting as resource banks for information, and assisting governments and 
international organizations ‘in the monitoring of international agreements, to undertake 
policy evaluations, and to help diffuse analysis on international best practice’ (Stone, 
2003: 7).  To read these networks as the upper tier of a new system of multi-level 
governance (i.e. the international level) would be misleading, even if they are aligned 
with international NGOs and international governmental structures.  This is because, 
firstly, as networks they operate at various spatial scales and through highly fluid, non-
territorial forms of organization, and secondly, because the ‘complex, overlapping social 
                                                                                                                                                 
actors that participation in the global economy would necessarily enhance the economic fortunes of 
national economies’, p. 298), played a vital role in the East Asian Crisis by stimulating outward investment 
and corporate reliance on external capital markets. 
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mosaic’ (Stone, 2003: 8) they represent are power structures in their own right, with 
elitism, gate keeping, special interest domination, advocacy, lobbying and influence as 
intrinsic elements of the network, exercising pervasive influence.  Their role in the 
political economy of world poverty and inequality cannot be ignored, less as a direct 
influence, but as drivers of policy choices made at international and local level. 
 
It makes little sense to speak of development policies based on territorial systems of 
innovation and/or indigenous knowledge.  There is a new political economy of network 
knowledge from which local knowledges are not independent.  This is not simply a 
matter of spatial scale, but a matter of new ecologies of knowledge formation that do not 
break down into traditional functional, corporate and geographical boundaries.  A good 
example is the rise of project-based ecologies of innovation and learning, now extensive 
in many creative industries.  Gernot Grabher (2004a), using the examples of advertising 
and software, argues that project-based teams of innovation are ‘both ensembles of 
organizations, communities and networks and also ecologies of organizational logics, 
professional ethos’ and individual identities and loyalties’ (p. 117).  For Grabher, 
learning in these teams involves constant switching between core teams, firms and 
epistemic communities, a communality based on lasting and intense ties, a sociality based 
on intense but ephemeral social ties, and connectivity based on transient and weak 
networks, all of which, in turn, involve varying spatial configurations.  The new social 
dynamics of knowledge formation – project-orientation, relational ties, communities of 
practice, sociality and reputation – though increasingly recognized in discussions on 
science, technology and organizational learning (Amin and Cohendet, 2004), seem 
curiously absent in mainstream development thinking.  There seems to be little 
recognition of how these forms of organizing for creativity could be harnessed to anti-
poverty strategies and there certainly seems to be virtually no awareness of how these 
forms are driving new cleavages between the global economic elite and their others.    
 
The third and final example of heterarchical regulation associated with globalization that 
I wish to discuss relates to regulatory impulses thrown up by the extraordinary increase in 
the global migration of the poor over the last fifty years.  There is no shortage of 
literature on the dynamics of this ‘hydra’ (Harris, 2002) that gathers immigrants as 
seasonal or contract workers with no citizenship rights (circa 20 million worldwide in the 
1990s, according to Harris, and increasingly women who account for 80% of such labour 
in Asia working as maids, factory workers, homeworkers and entertainment/sex 
workers); more than 30 million illegal border crossings a year for work in the informal or 
illegal economy; circa a million vulnerable women and children traded as slaves in 
prostitution and related industries, bonded labour and couriers for narcotic gangs; and 
around 25 million asylum seekers facing varying degrees of exclusion, uncertainty and 
vilification in different countries.  In turn, there is no shortage of literature relating these 
dynamics to different aspects of globalization, such as the impact of structural adjustment 
policies and TNC practices on income and employment opportunities in developing 
countries (Pyle, 2001), or the seductions of new forms of consumerism and global 
tourism.  Discussion on the regulatory aspects of global migration, however, has been one 
sided, with attention largely focused on what governments and the international policy 
community should do to prevent out-migration through better poverty alleviation 
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programmes and other measures to reduce vulnerability, to police the webs of organized 
human trade, and to improve the experience of migrants in recipient countries by relaxing 
immigration controls and offering better rights.  These are interventions that could make 
a real difference to the lives of the global poor.  One significant flaw, however, is the 
tendency to view migration as a flow in need of (public policy) regulation, rather than a 
process with its own intricate regulatory machinery: one that is not that easily controlled, 
one that may be uncomfortably close to existing national and international policy 
priorities, and one that throws up new public policy challenges.   
 
Let us take two examples of ordering – in the remittance economy and in the global 
sex/drug/incarceration complex.  Family remittances have come to play a major role in 
many developing countries.  For example, the Central American and Caribbean countries 
rely heavily on remittances, which, in the case of Nicaragua represent a quarter of the 
national income, and in the case of Mexico, 10 per cent of the total value of exports 
(Orozco, 2002).  These networks, as Manuel Orozco explains in the case of donations 
from the US, are highly organized, involving large numbers of emigrant clubs and 
‘hometown associations’ that make charitable donations and send funds for 
infrastructural projects, human development projects such as scholarships and libraries 
and income generation programmes.  In turn, a series of intermediaries such as couriers, 
banks and credit unions enable the transfers, while governments in the countries of origin 
support elaborate schemes offering favourable interest rates, match funding, dollar bank 
accounts and exemption from import duties to encourage the remittances.  There is a 
transnational chain of regulation using out-migration for developmental purposes, a chain 
that, in some countries such as the Philippines, involves government-sponsored and 
privately run schemes to prepare and train emigrants for overseas employment and ensure 
their regular return (Tyner, 2002).  Such examples of national development5 based on the 
controlled circulation of nationals and their overseas income sit uncomfortably with the 
migration controls mentioned above.  They reveal that there is much more regulation at 
work in the migration industry than normally assumed, one reason why proposals by 
scholars such as Nigel Harris (2002) to remove all border controls in the world to tackle 
poverty (so that supply and demand can be matched and so that the horrors of human 
trade industry can be avoided), may not prove to be that wild or controversial, in that no 
major explosion of uncontrolled migration will result. 
 
Similarly, the long, arduous and humiliating dislocations faced by women kept constantly 
on the move in the global sex industry are held up by a complicated web of shadow 
regulation, fed unwittingly or otherwise by public policies at national and international 
level.  Ursula Biemann (2002: 86) notes that the ‘new geography … being mapped by the 
recruitment of women among minorities and slum communities, their transportation 
along trafficking routes and across borders, abroad and off-shore for labour in the global 
sex industry’ is ‘not conducted by mighty syndicates’, but is based on trafficking 
operations ‘in small units, relatives or acquaintances who recruit girls in slum 
                                                 
5 See Mohan and Zack-Williams (2002) for an account of how African transnational diaspora networks are 
contributing to development in the countries of origin through the flow of ideas and resources based on 
remittance networks, returnee projects, religious, ethnic and community organizations, political campaigns, 
developmental projects. 
 17
neighbourhoods, frequently there are bi-national couples who have good contacts to the 
source country’.  There are many small actors in many geographical chains involved in 
making this trade an organized industry, including recruitment agents, money lenders, 
document specialists, traffickers and couriers on the supply side, and entertainment 
agencies, housing agents, communal networks, community welfare groups, pimps, 
matriarchs and the like, on the demand side.  Supporting these chains are government 
approved schemes such as the training, licensing and accreditation of ‘overseas 
performing artists’ in the Philippines (Tyner, 2002), and Thai investment in an 
entertainment complex that relies centrally on global sex tourism for the national 
revenue.  But there are also significant international regulatory forces at work, such as the 
poverty effects of Washington Consensus policies, resulting in pushing women in the 
global south into the criminal or illicit economy.  New globalization impulses are also 
implicated in surprising ways.  For example, the rise of a global prison industrial complex 
that ‘multinational prison corporations have fueled … through an aggressive strategy of 
pursuing foreign market through sophisticated marketing techniques’ (Sudbury, 2002: 62) 
has draw many governments into the logic of incarceration for drug/sex offenders, 
resulting in a spectacular rise in the women prison population.  These layered and 
distributed regulatory impulses – official and covert – will not disappear when new 
macro-regimes to tackle world poverty and inequality are put into place.   
 
Conclusion 
 
I suspect there are many more similar topologies of global regulation, directing, for 
example, the everyday workings of internet communities, internet-based financial 
trading, money laundering and the international drugs trade.  I have tried to show that 
these orderings are as significant as it gets in the making of the contemporary world and 
in determining economic fortunes across the globe.  To perceive them as of secondary 
importance to the meta-orders discussed in the first half of the paper, is simply to fail to 
recognize and economic ontology composed of topological spaces, network forms of 
organization and distanciated connectivities and flows.  The deficiency lies with the 
obduracy of scalar – Russian doll – models of regulation which assume that the economy 
falls into neat territorial packages that can be governed, in conditions of extensive 
globalization by better inter-scalar coordination and more effective governance by global 
institutions.  But what if the world no longer works in this way?   
 
An important question raised by these micro-worlds of regulation with macro-powers is 
whether they add up to a coherent new world order or indeed a Hayekian universe if 
some kind in which the multiple orderings and volatile intersections between them 
constantly defy deliberative macro-regulation or planning6.  My belief is that neither 
interpretation necessary follows from registering the presence of micro-orders of global 
regulation.  As regards the first interpretation, John Urry (2003: 103), for example, has 
argued that the new developments amount at best to ‘pockets of order (or ordering) 
within a sea of global disorder’.  I think the opposite is the case.  The growing density of 
these fractal spaces of global regulation can be considered as steps towards a new 
                                                 
6 I am grateful to one of the referees for asking whether my argument is a Hayekian one. 
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regulatory regime accreted through aggregation, overlap and filling in of gaps created by 
the failings of territorial/scalar regulation.  I tend to see the present as a moment of 
regulatory excess, multiple ordering (scalar, network, fluid), and slow systematicity based 
on the intersections and clashes produced by the latter.  A new global regime of 
governance, if we can use this term, thus, is unlikely to possess the coherence of a 
machinic order.  But then, has this ever existed in the context of systems of governance 
based on distributed power and order?  Any coherence that is likely to emerge, therefore, 
will be temporary, fragile, and incomplete – the product of commonalities resulting from 
the orderings that cut the deepest channels (e.g. particular network management 
technologies, particular tools of distributed governance), the overarching 
governmentalities that come to prevail through varied processes of inducement (e.g. neo-
liberalism, responsible capitalism), and the settlements yielded by the politics of 
government and opposition across different spatial arrangements.  It will not be the 
product of systemic fit, system logic, or hegemonic purpose.  Perhaps the key difference 
in today’s circumstances of globalization is that the role of the state in regulation has 
become less pivotal and that regulation through territorial jurisdiction and control has 
weakened.  This does not necessarily amount to a condition of regulatory disorder, 
simply a change in the institutional and spatial nature of the order.   
 
In turn, the institutional and spatial fecundity is no Hayekian utopia or dystopia, for at 
least two reasons.  First, there is no inverted macro-micro dynamic, where the powers of 
the micro have replaced the powers of the macro.  The entire thrust of my argument has 
been to reject this dualism and its imputed hierarchy of influence and regulatory 
significance, in preference of a level plane made up of all kinds of hybrid.  Indeed, the 
analysis dispels with the traditionally-held ontological distinction between 
microeconomic and macroeconomic regulation.  Second, my interpretation comes with an 
understanding of order as the product of dissonance and reconciliation between 
institutionalized practices of various sorts – the serious work of those with a dominating 
bent, the replication of particular discourses of governance, the gradual sedimentation of 
recursive practices as institutional norms, the serious work of praising some models and 
vilifying others, the magic of revelation and enrolment.  These are not the forces of a 
Hayekian order that settles around a republic of small autonomies and self-regulating 
propensities.  They are the forces of an order that is ordered – but always in fragile ways 
and always in ways that hurt the many - through the power-works that Foucault and more 
latterly Actor Network approaches have been so effective in tracing. 
 
What are the implications of seeing globalization as the uneven play between orderings 
of different institutional composition and spatial reach for the meta-narratives discussed 
in the first part of the paper?  First, the cuts made by the tramlines of new global micro-
ordering raise some doubt over the possibility of deglobalization.  These orderings will 
bypass or blunt reforms based on reasserting state/intergovernmental regulation (Tanzi, 
2001).  They also cast doubt over arguments in some parts of the anti-globalization 
movement to re-embed local economies in local societies through support for subsistence 
cultures, local markets and an economy of social needs decoupled from the market 
economy (Bello, 2002; Nash, 2003; Goldsmith and Mander, 2001).  While there is merit 
in the argument that the market economy may be of limited use to many local 
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communities in the global south, the tacit assumption that everyday modernity and 
exteriority can be kept at bay to achieve these goals is flawed.   
 
Secondly, the story of micro-worlds of regulation is not an argument against global-level 
reform.  Some of the proposed international reforms, especially the pro-poor and pro-
development reorientation of the major institutions could make a real difference in 
tackling the increase in global inequality and poverty associated with neo-
liberal/Washington Consensus globalization.  Stricter rules on the local practices of 
TNCs, the offer of long-term developmental finance, the conversion of the IMF and 
World Bank into pro-South organizations, G7 openness to the demands of the anti-
globalization movement for better risk assessment and more humane policies, should not 
be under estimated.  What the micro-worlds of regulation puncture, however, are the 
expectations of regime control common to the policy literature on a new international 
order.  As systems of alternative regulation, they have the power to disrupt by organizing 
economic life in non-territorial systems, and in ways that incorporate scalar and territorial 
rules of governance.  They too are major influences on the dynamics of poverty and 
inequality associated with contemporary globalization, possessing a power that the meta-
narratives are failing to address.  Their existence should really make us rethink the 
assumption circulating at the moment that while non-territorial forms of organization 
may be rising to a penny, they are either blunted by or subordinated to actors such as 
nation states because of their historic role in managing bounded political space, still 
considered to be the central sphere of political regulation7.  My analysis in this paper 
questions this assumption by attempting to show that the new micro-worlds of regulation 
are not only as ‘political’ as state-territorial forms, but that they are, in many cases, 
interwoven with them in complex hybrid arrangements. 
 
Finally, a word on the power of dreams, which is where I think the meta-narratives of 
globalization really do matter in terms of their global capture.  The normative debate on 
globalization is as much a debate about possibilities for order as it is about the 
naturalization of ‘orders of worth’ (Stark, 2000) re-narrated to the world.  This has been 
the power of discourses of neo-liberalism, the new economy, the Third Way and attempts 
to reinvent social democracy.  With the help of an array of small objects these discourses 
have narrated a global mind set and normativity for all to follow and be judged by.  When 
the attendant rules have failed or been tested by the new micro-orderings, the discourses 
have stepped in as the measure of worth - one reason why we should never 
‘underestimate the power of spells and dream work in the economy’ (Löfgren, 2003: 
249).  This is the where the anti-globalization movement has a vital role to play, in 
naturalizing another globalism based on ‘personal well-being, environmental 
enhancement, social justice, human rights, space for personal creativity and technical 
innovation, enlightened international law and regulation, the end of the war system, the 
politics of individual and group fulfillment, the promotion of cultural expression and 
preservation, and citizen control’ (Bray and Bray, 2002: 117).  Dreams?  Yes, but then 
look at the spell cast by neo-liberalism. 
 
                                                 
7 This is a point highlighted by the second of the two referees who commented on this paper. 
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